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I nequality has been rising across the world in recent decades. Latin America has been an exception to what otherwise seems to be the 
prevalent trend in the U.S., Europe and Asia. In 
the U.S. the rise in inequality since the 1970s 
has coincided with the rise in Mexican immi-
gration. In Mexico, inequality has been declin-
ing since the mid-1990s, a period during which 
emigration to the U.S. first increased to historic 
highs and then declined steeply.
Our review of the literature suggests that 
low-skilled immigration to the U.S., much 
of it from Mexico, has only played a minor 
role in rising income and wage inequality. To 
the extent that there is an effect, it has come 
through the presence of immigrants, and less 
as a result of immigration’s effect on natives’ 
wages. Immigrants’ bimodal skill distribution, 
with clustering at the top and bottom of the 
U.S. skill distribution, has widened the overall 
income distribution slightly.  
At the same time, low-skilled immigration to 
the U.S. and migrants’ remittances have played 
a large role in lowering global inequality by 
moving millions of low-income Mexican fami-
lies further away from poverty and closer to the 
global middle class. Migration also has broad-
er economic benefits in the destination for em-
ployers and consumers, especially in light of the 
aging of the U.S. workforce and rising labor 
force needs. Hence, our policy recommenda-
tions include boosting legal employment-based 
migration from Mexico to the U.S. We also sug-
gest a host of other initiatives that can decrease 
inequality, such as increasing education out-
comes, workforce training and access to credit. 
EVIDENCE FROM MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES*
Does Migration Cause 
Income Inequality?
* The views expressed here are solely those of the authors and do not reflect those 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System.
Pia M. Orrenius | Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
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Mexico-U.S. migration has trended sharply up-
ward for the better part of the last four decades. 
Income inequality has also risen in the United 
States and declined in Mexico over roughly the 
same period.1 Are the two trends causally related? 
Has emigration from Mexico increased income in-
equality in the U.S. while lowering it in Mexico? 
From an international perspective, migration 
from poor to rich countries lowers global in-
equality by significantly increasing the wages of 
those who are otherwise near the bottom of the 
world distribution of income. From an economic 
perspective, reducing global inequality is far more 
important than what happens within any one 
country. From a political economy perspective, 
however, what happens within countries may be 
all that voters care about and therefore influenc-
es immigration policy.2 Voters and lawmakers in 
destination countries appear to put little weight 
on the so-called global gains from migration—
the increase in world productivity and output 
that would follow if workers could freely migrate 
across international borders.3 
The potential economic gains from liberaliza-
tion of immigration are massive; complete free-
dom of movement could more than double world 
GDP.4 Yet these gains remain largely unrealized be-
cause of barriers to international migration. Pov-
erty is a barrier to migration for some, but gov-
ernment-erected barriers are far more important. 
Mexico-U.S. immigration has historically been un-
usual because it occurred on a large scale despite 
government-erected barriers to migration. In the 
more recent period, however, such barriers appear 
to have become binding, and Mexico-U.S. migra-
tion has slowed to a trickle partly as a result. 
Public and political opinion around immigra-
tion focuses on domestic effects of international 
migration, particularly whether it helps or hurts 
relatively low-wage natives. In an era of rising in-
equality in the U.S. and many other industrialized 
nations, it may be tempting to attribute rising in-
equality to immigration. In Mexico, inequality 
has fallen in the last two decades, and there is 
little research on how that is related to first the 
rise and then the fall in emigration during this 
time. Whether it’s the U.S. or Mexico, our review 
of the inequality literature suggests a host of oth-
er contemporaneous trends have played a larger 
role in driving changes in income inequality, most 
notably globalization in the form of international 
trade and skill-biased technological change. 
In this article, we explore recent trends in 
Mexico-U.S. migration and inequality in the two 
countries. We provide an overview of the eco-
nomic effects of immigration and emigration in 
the Mexico-U.S. case. We find that while Mexi-
can migration may have slightly reduced wages 
for some U.S. workers and slightly increased in-
equality in the U.S., it raised wages in Mexico. 
There is some evidence that by raising wages for 
the lower middle class and stimulating remit-
tances, migration may have lowered Mexican 
income inequality in recent years once direct and 
indirect effects are accounted for, but more re-
search is needed. 
Given that migration plays only a small role 
in inequality trends and is beneficial on net for 
migrants, sending communities, and destination 
countries, public policy should focus on reducing 
migration barriers and making international mo-
bility more efficient and less costly. 
INTRODUCTION
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TRENDS IN MEXICO-U.S. MIGRATION
Mexico-U.S. migration goes back well over a cen-
tury. It is deeply rooted in a recurring theme: U.S. 
employers’ need for workers.5 Whether it was the 
building of the railroads, settling and farming 
the western frontier, or bolstering the workforce 
during and after World War II, Mexican workers 
were in high demand north of the border. But while 
inflows were substantial, estimated at 450,000 per 
year during the height of the Bracero period, re-
turn migration was high as well.6 Mexican work-
ers came largely for seasonal work, leaving their 
families in Mexico and returning there once their 
employment stints concluded.  
Patterns of return migration among Mexican 
immigrants began to switch to permanent settle-
ment in the 1970s and 1980s. The change came 
after the Bracero program ended in 1964 and 
the 1965 U.S. immigration law limited perma-
nent immigration from the western Hemisphere, 
including Mexico. Reduced avenues to migrate 
legally at the same time as the Mexico popula-
tion was undergoing a demographic boom and 
the U.S. economy was growing, launched an era 
of mass undocumented migration. The increase in 
unauthorized immigration was followed by a suc-
cessive buildup in border enforcement as well as 
a major amnesty in 1986 that granted permanent 
residence to over 2 million Mexican immigrants. 
At the same time, the U.S. economy was un-
dergoing structural changes that beckoned addi-
tional workers. The accelerated transition to a ser-
vice-based economy after recessions in the 1970s 
and early 1980s led to a rise in year-round op-
portunities for low-skilled workers. Mexico-U.S. 
migration continued to rise throughout the 1990s 
and into the 2000s as migrant networks facilitated 
migration, and U.S. employers came to depend on 
immigrant workers. The Mexico-born population 
living in the United States rose from 760,000 in 
1970 to a peak of 12.7 million in 2007 (Figure 1).
The cumulative effects of such rapid increases 
in immigration are considerable. By 2007, over 
FIGURE 1. Mexico-born Population in the United States, 1850-2015
SOURCES: For Mexican-born 1850 to 1980: Gibson, Campbell and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Population of the 
United States: 1850-2000,” U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division, Working Paper No. 81, 2006; for 1980 and 1990: Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series (IPUMS-USA); for 1995 to 2003: Pew Hispanic Center estimates based on augmented March Current Population Surveys and 









1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Millions
Seminar Migration, Inequality and Public Policies / El Colegio de México
4 / / 5
NOTES ON 
MIGRATION AND INEQUALITIES Does Migration Cause Income Inequality?
10 percent of the Mexico population lived in the 
U.S. Today, about one-quarter of U.S. immigrants 
are from Mexico; it’s by far the largest source 
country. While recent inflows of Mexican immi-
grants are greatly diminished from their peak in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, they are still siz-
able, at around 140,000 new arrivals per year.7 
Nonetheless, the Mexico-born population in the 
U.S. has declined since the 2007-2009 Great Re-
cession, implying that inflows are closely matched 
by outflows.8  
It bears noting that a large share of Mexican 
immigration has historically been undocumented, 
which may explain how it has grown so quickly 
and why it has ebbed and flowed with the U.S. 
business cycle.9 It has been less encumbered by 
the immigration bureaucracy, at least on the front 
end, than inflows from other nations. 
TRENDS IN INEQUALITY
Concurrent with the rise in emigration from Mex-
ico and subsequent immigration of Mexicans into 
the U.S., there has been a steep rise in income in-
equality in the U.S. and a modest decline in Mex-
ico (Figure 2). Mexico, with a Gini coefficient of 
0.48, has higher income inequality than the U.S. 
(Gini coefficient of 0.42).10 However, the trends 
in the chart show that the gap is growing smaller; 
inequality in the two nations appears to be con-
verging. The evolution of inequality in Mexico is 
also more varied than in the U.S.; it rises from 
the 1980s until the mid-1990s and then declines. 
Other Latin American countries also saw falling 
income inequality in the 2000s, bucking a global 
trend of rising inequality. 11
A large literature documents rising inequali-
ty in the U.S. and many other nations over the 
last three to four decades. Even nations with ag-
gressive redistribution policies, such as the Scan-
dinavian countries, have experienced growing 
inequality. Higher inequality is caused by an in-
creasing ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled wag-
es, but the drivers of this growing gap are likely 
a combination of factors. These drivers fall into 
two major camps, one focused on the forces of 
FIGURE 2. Inequality in the United States and Mexico: 1980-2015
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globalization and the other on skill-biased tech-
nological change.
Globalization
Some studies place economic and financial glo-
balization at the heart of the factors driving the 
increase in the ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled 
wages, arguing that globalization has creat-
ed more opportunities for high-skilled workers 
while exposing low-skilled workers (primarily in 
advanced economies) to competition from for-
eign (cheaper) labor and eroding their bargaining 
power.12 
Globalization involves increased flows of 
goods, people, and capital across international 
borders; the increase in flows of goods and cap-
ital has far outstripped the increase in interna-
tional migration. Labor market institutions that 
might have helped shield low-skilled workers 
from the effects of globalization have weakened 
in some countries. In the U.S., for example, the 
erosion of the real minimum wage and a decline 
in unionization have contributed to falling wages 
at the bottom of the income distribution.13 
At the same time, the globalization of produc-
tion has likely also increased corporate profits 
(the return to capital), which has led to higher 
asset prices (for stocks, property, and land), fac-
tors that inflate executive pay and boost wealth 
inequality as well as income inequality, especially 
in advanced economies.14 
In emerging market economies, meanwhile, in-
creased foreign investment and production have 
lifted the wages of low- and mid-skilled workers 
relative to their counterparts in advanced econ-
omies15. While liberalization of trade and in-
vestment was initially blamed for rising income 
inequality in Mexico,16 recent research reaches 
more nuanced conclusions. After 2000, Mexican 
income inequality began to steadily decline, and 
the middle class began to grow.17 
Skill-biased technological change
Next to globalization, skill-biased technologi-
cal change is one of the most cited explanations 
for increased wage inequality since the 1970s. 
Early studies noted that firms’ ability to increas-
ingly substitute technology for workers reduced 
the demand for low-skilled workers, depressing 
their wages.18 Over time, however, this hypoth-
esis proved inconsistent with what emerged as a 
U-shaped pattern of labor market polarization. 
Polarization involves falling employment shares 
of mid-skill occupations amid rising shares of 
low- and high-skilled occupations, or an hour-
glass-shaped distribution of jobs with regard to 
skill. A modified version of the skill-biased tech-
nological change hypothesis emphasized that tech-
nological change complements abstract (high-edu-
cation) tasks while substituting for routine (mid-
dle-education) tasks.19 Later work showed that 
this model held not just for the U.S., but also for 
16 Western European countries, and was a much 
more important factor than offshoring—a key 
part of globalization—in explaining polariza-
tion.20 More recent work has coined the phrase 
‘routine-biased technological change’ to better 
describe the hollowing out of employment in oc-
cupations with routine-type functions.21
It bears noting that globalization also does 
not fit well with the pattern of labor market po-
larization in advanced economies. According to 
Lake and Millimet (2016), routine-biased tech-
nological change can fully explain polarization, 
whereas the trade effect is negative across the 
board, affecting low- and high-skilled workers as 
much as mid-skilled workers.22 They find that it’s 
the vulnerability of locations that is driving the 
adverse effects of trade, not the types of occupa-
tions or workers’ skills. If their hypothesis bears 
out, the policy implications are clear, namely to 
retrain workers in vulnerable areas, not in vulner-
able occupations. 
MIGRATION’S EFFECT ON INEQUALITY
Migration fits into both the globalization and 
technological change hypotheses above. In addi-
tion to trade in goods and services, globalization 
encompasses the movement of factors of produc-
tion, including labor (migration) and capital (in-
vestment). A standard two-country model of mi-
gration dictates that workers should move from 
the labor-rich country where wages are relative-
ly low to the labor-scarce country where wages 
are relatively high. This describes the Mexico-US 
case rather well, at least up until the 2007-2009 
Great Recession. The resultant effects on income 
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inequality in the origin and the destination de-
pend on where the migrants fall in the two coun-
tries’ income distributions and also on the effect 
of migration on the wages of other workers. 
Migration may be related to skill-biased tech-
nological change as well. An influx of low-skilled 
workers may slow the adoption of labor-saving 
technology by firms; an influx of high-skilled 
workers may accelerate it. Low- and high-skilled 
immigrants may be complements or substitutes 
for native workers, potentially increasing or re-
ducing their wages. To the extent that immigrants 
lower the cost of the goods and services they pro-
duce, they can spur job creation at the extremes 
of the skill distribution, contributing to the 
U-shaped pattern of polarization of employment.
The U.S. Case
Immigrants to the U.S. are at the two ends of the 
skill distribution. Immigrants from Mexico and 
developing countries tend to be at the bottom, 
while immigrants from most of Asia, particularly 
China and India, tend to be at the top. Figure 3 
shows the share of US workers who are foreign 
born by education level. Immigrants are over rep-
resented among high school dropouts and those 
with professional and graduate degrees. Given 
this pattern, immigration seems unlikely to be di-
rectly related to what is happening in the middle 
of the skill distribution. 
Mass low-skilled immigration (much of it from 
Mexico) into the U.S. in the 1980s, 1990s, and 
early 2000s likely had a negative, albeit small, 
impact on the wages of similarly low-skilled na-
tives.23 A survey of the evidence indicates that sta-
tistically significant negative wage and employ-
ment effects on natives are generally only found 
among high school dropouts, who are a shrinking 
share of the U.S.-born labor force.24 
The fact that wage and employment effects, to 
the extent that they occur, affect the least-educated 
native workers, is also inconsistent with immigra-
tion contributing to the disappearance of mid-skill 
jobs, the cornerstone of the polarization hypothe-
sis. Of course, immigration is not totally separate 
from labor market polarization. For example, it’s 
likely that large inflows of low-skilled immigrants 
contributed to rising employment shares in low-
skilled occupations since immigrants provide the 
types of services that have experienced rising de-
mand. They may even contribute to rising employ-
ment in high-skilled occupations to the extent that 
they lower the costs of services that, for example, 
high-skilled married women need to go back to 
work, such as child care.25 
Card (2009) is one of the few studies that di-
rectly addresses the question of immigration’s im-
pact on U.S. wage inequality.26 He argues that im-
migration has had a negligible impact on inequal-
ity among U.S. natives, largely because immigra-
tion has only had minor effects on wage differ-
ences across U.S. natives in different skill groups. 
Nevertheless, overall U.S. wage inequality is high-
er than it would be without immigration due to 
compositional effects. Immigrants are clustered 
at the high and low ends of the education distri-
bution and have higher residual wage inequality 
than natives; hence their presence accounted for 
about 5 percent of the increase in wage inequality 
between 1980 and 2005, according to Card.  
Card’s findings are consistent with the consen-
sus report by the National Academies (2016) and 
several other studies.27 Rienzo (2014) also finds 
that residual wage inequality is higher among im-
migrants than among natives, but that immigration 
has not been the major force behind the increase 
in such inequality in the U.S. (or the UK).28 Gould 
(2015) agrees that the direct effect of immigration 
on inequality is not significant, but in areas experi-
encing a manufacturing decline, an influx of low-
skilled immigrants tends to increase inequality.29 
Hibbs and Hong (2015) do not consider wag-
es, but rather correlations of changes in the Gini 
index with immigrant shares in U.S. metropoli-
tan areas.30 They conclude that immigration be-
tween 1990 and 2000 explains 24 percent of the 
increase in overall income inequality during this 
time; however, they find that low-skilled immi-
gration, as proxied by Mexican immigration, 
played no role in this increase. In their study of 
the same time period but considering only rural 
U.S. counties, Parrado and Kandel (2010) find lit-
tle relationship between growth in the Hispanic 
population and changes in income inequality.31 
George Borjas is a long-time critic of the 
cross-area (spatial) analysis that most studies 
rely on to estimate the wage, employment, and 
inequality effects of immigration. He argues that 
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natives leave areas that experience immigration 
in a way that biases spatial estimates away from 
finding an adverse impact on natives. In Aydemir 
and Borjas (2007), the authors estimate wage and 
employment effects at the national level and find 
much larger negative wage effects on U.S. natives 
than do other studies.32 Of course, their approach, 
while not subject to spatial bias, requires making 
more assumptions about the composition of edu-
cation/experience groups and who competes with 
whom. These statistical modeling constraints 
tend to result in more-adverse wage effects than 
is found in studies that do not impose such strict 
assumptions. In any case, Aydemir and Borjas 
(2007) conclude that low-skilled immigration 
to the US has accounted for about one-fifth of 
the decline in the real wages of high school drop-
out men between 1980 and 2000.33 Low-skilled 
immigration has therefore contributed to higher 
wage inequality but, again, it has not been a pri-
mary driver.
The Mexican Case
If migration lowers wages for competing workers 
in the destination country, it should raise wag-
es for comparable workers in the origin country. 
Several studies find positive wage effects as a 
consequence of Mexican emigration to the U.S. 
Mishra (2007) estimates that 16 percent of the 
Mexican labor force was working in the U.S. in 
2000, and the outflow of Mexican workers to the 
U.S. between 1970 and 2000 increased the wage 
of the average Mexican worker by 8 percent.34 
One might be tempted to conclude that higher 
wages in the wake of emigration reduces income 
inequality, but it is not so straightforward. The im-
pact on inequality depends on where the emigrants 
are in the skill/wage distribution. The Roy mod-
el, a favorite tool of economists studying migrant 
selection, predicts that migrants from Mexico to 
the U.S. will be negatively selected, drawn from 
the bottom of the skill/wage distribution.35 The 
early empirical research on self-selection, howev-
NOTE: Chart shows percentage immigrants in U.S. labor force over age 25 at each education level.
SOURCE: 2016 American Community Survey.  
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er, found that Mexican migrants’ education levels 
were about average or, in other words, not that 
different from non-migrants.36 Later work that 
considered wages rather than education, found 
some evidence of negative selection.37
One rationale for why the Roy model may 
have failed to hold in the Mexican case is dis-
cussed by McKenzie and Rapoport (2007), who 
posit that the ability to pay the costs of migration 
is correlated with skill, and low-skill workers sim-
ply cannot afford to migrate.38 The authors proxy 
for the costs of migration with access to migrant 
networks and find that, indeed, Mexican migrants 
from villages with extensive migrant networks 
are more negatively selected than those from vi-
llages with limited migrant networks. This evolu-
tion of migrant networks and the impact on the 
skill levels of migrants has potentially important 
effects on inequality. As migrants become increas-
ingly negatively selected, the positive wage effects 
should move down the skill distribution and re-
duce inequality. No empirical work that we know 
of has demonstrated this effect, however. 
Mishra (2007) and Aydemir and Borjas (2007) 
both extend their analyses of the positive wage 
effects of emigration to estimate the impact on 
Mexican wage inequality in 1990-2000.39 They 
both find that while emigration increased the 
wages of high school dropouts, their wages still 
declined relative to high school graduates, with 
Texas is the second most popular destination 
after California for Mexican immigrants. There 
were about 2.7 million immigrants from Mexico 
living in Texas in 2016; they make up 52 percent 
of the state’s immigrant population.59 Mexican 
immigrants in Texas have relatively low levels of 
education, much like they do in the rest of the 
U.S. and are concentrated in relatively low-wage 
sectors such as construction, leisure and hospi-
tality, agriculture, and domestic service. A signif-
icant share of Mexican immigrants in Texas is 
undocumented, perhaps over one-half.     
Mexican immigration to Texas sped up in the 
1970s and 1980s, years when the oil sector was 
booming and other parts of the U.S. were in reces-
sion. Although immigration slowed when the oil 
price collapsed in 1986, it picked up again in the 
1990s. Between 1990 and 2010, the immigrant 
share of the state population rose from 9 to 16 
percent, much of that driven by Mexico.60 At the 
same time, employment grew at twice the rate of 
the nation while wages kept pace with the nation 
despite the large influx of workers. 
Periods of rapid economic growth are often 
accompanied by higher inequality, yet most mea-
sures suggest that inequality in Texas did not 
grow as fast as it did in the rest of the nation. 
The income share of the top 1 percent increased 
in Texas between 1979 and 2007 but not as fast 
as in the rest of the nation.61 State-level Gini co-
efficients also suggest that Texas inequality has 
lagged the increases in other large states since 
1970 (Figure 4). 
In sum, the Texas experience suggests Mex-
ican immigration did not materially contribute 
to increased income inequality in the state. If it 
had been a major contributor, Texas measures of 
inequality should have been as high as or higher 
than those of the other large states.
The Texas Case
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migration accounting for over one-third of the 
change. The counterintuitive result may partly be 
an artifact of the short and unique time period 
under study, 1990-2000.40 Another problem is 
the definition of educational categories. 
U.S. researchers tend to lump all low-skilled 
workers into a ‘high school dropout’ category for 
comparability with the U.S. and Canada labor 
markets. But this is not appropriate in the Mexi-
can case where, since the 1970s, the modal educa-
tional category was initially primary school (6 to 
8 years of school)41 and then secondary school (9 
to 11 years education).42 In other words, the great 
majority of Mexican workers still today have less 
than a high school diploma. To capture the effect 
on income inequality would require breaking up 
the ‘high school dropout’ group into much finer 
gradations.
Studies of migration and inequality in the 
Mexican case also do not consider the composi-
tional impact of mass emigration of middle-class 
Mexicans on wage inequality. The great majority 
of migrants had between 6 and 11 years of edu-
cation, putting many of them in the middle class 
there (although in the lower socioeconomic class 
in the U.S.). This exodus must have created a hole 
in the income distribution that resulted in more 
wage inequality despite raising wages on average. 
In general, there is a need for additional studies 
on Mexican emigration and changes in inequality. 
SOURCE: Frank-Sommeiller-Price series.
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Moreover, given recent Mexican trends, more re-
search is needed on the economic effects of return 
migration and rising Central American migration. 
From 2009-2014, one million Mexicans and their 
families returned to Mexico, some involuntarily.43 
There is mixed evidence on the success of their 
reintegration.44 And although the volume of Cen-
tral American migration is small at the national 
level, there are significant inflows of Guatemalan 
workers in Chiapas, for instance.45
Role of Remittances
Remittances, migrants’ money transfers back 
home, represent an additional way in which mi-
gration can affect inequality. Mexico is the larg-
est recipient of remittances in Latin America and 
took in a record $29 billion in 2017.46 Remittanc-
es, while sizable, represent only about 2.7 per-
cent of Mexico GDP, since it’s a large economy. 
In poorer states with heavy emigration, however, 
the impact is much larger. Remittances represent 
11.1 and 9.5 percent of GDP in Michoacán and 
Guerrero, respectively.47
About three-quarters of Mexico remittances 
go to households in the bottom half of the income 
distribution, which suggests they have a role to 
play in suppressing income inequality.48 In addi-
tion, remittances make up over half of the income 
of the poorest decile of Mexican households. 
Studies that measure the effect of remittances 
on poverty and inequality tend to show the im-
pacts are helpful but small; for example, in Lat-
in America on average, a 1 percentage point in-
crease in remittances as a share of GDP reduces 
inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) 
by about 0.08 percent and poverty by 0.37 per-
cent.49 In the Mexican case, receiving remittances 
reduces a household’s probability of being in pov-
erty by 6 to 10 percentage points.50 The evidence 
on inequality is more mixed, however. Mora-Ri-
vera (2005) shows that international remittanc-
es increase the Gini coefficient in rural Mexican 
communities.51 
Arslan and Taylor (2012) find that the impact 
of remittances on rural inequality depends on the 
extent of migration prevalence in the commu-
nity.52 At lower levels, remittances ‘equalize’ the 
income distribution; at higher levels, they have 
the opposite effect. Meanwhile, Orrenius et al. 
(2012) use state-level data to show that remit-
tances likely decrease wage inequality; remittanc-
es reduce the share of lowest-paid workers, those 
earning one minimum wage, and raise the share 
of higher-paid workers, those earning either 2-3 
or 3-5 times the minimum wage.53 There are ad-
ditional benefits in high-migration states, where 
remittances also increase employment and reduce 
the unemployment rate. 
INEQUALITY’S EFFECT ON MIGRATION
Throughout this policy brief, we have focused on 
the impact of migration on inequality but there 
is a literature that posits the causality can also 
run the other way. Relative deprivation captures 
the idea that a household’s relative income rather 
than its absolute income can also spur migration. 
Stark and Taylor (1989) find evidence that family 
members migrate in order to improve their house-
hold’s income position relative to households in 
their reference group.54 Controlling for expected 
absolute income changes, the greater a house-
hold’s initial relative deprivation, the higher the 
probability of Mexico-U.S. migration. The excep-
tion occurs at the very bottom of the communi-
ty’s income distribution, likely among households 
that cannot afford to migrate.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Inequality has many roots, and it’s not always bad. 
For example, periods of rapid economic growth 
are often accompanied by higher inequality, while 
recessions are typically accompanied by declining 
inequality. We clearly should not engineer reces-
sions in order to suppress inequality. Under com-
munism, people were equally poor; again, not a 
worthwhile tradeoff. The eradication of inequality 
should not be a policy maker’s primary goal.
Instead, policymakers should focus on getting 
society closer to equality of opportunity, also re-
ferred to as income or socioeconomic mobility. 
Is a child who is born poor doomed to always 
be poor, or does he have a realistic shot at join-
ing the middle class? There are a number of pol-
icy prescriptions that apply to safeguarding or 
spurring income mobility, including early child-
hood education for at-risk kids and high-quality 
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public schools. Workforce training and appren-
ticeship programs can help workers adjust to 
labor market changes. Safety net programs can 
sustain families who are hit by shocks, such as 
unemployment or a health crisis. Financial litera-
cy and innovative banking regulations can boost 
access to credit. Payments that help people move 
to areas where jobs are plentiful, from areas 
where they are not, can help spur socioeconomic 
mobility with a country.
Mexico’s period of falling income inequality 
coincides with a number of these policy initia-
tives and their associated outcomes. For exam-
ple, Mexico has experienced rising educational 
attainment. Federal and local authorities have 
also worked on extending the social safety net 
with both welfare programs (Prospera, previous-
ly known as Oportunidades) and universal health 
care (Seguro Popular).55 More recent reforms to 
bring workers into the formal sector where they 
are covered by government benefits, such as so-
cial security, are also helpful. And banking reg-
ulators have been aggressive in developing blue-
prints for new types of financial institutions that 
specialize in lending to low-income families and 
small businesses.56 
We can add managed migration to this list of pol-
icy prescriptions. Whether it’s a temporary worker 
program or other arrangement, legal and employ-
ment-based migration can be a win-win for sending 
and destination country. After all, Mexico-US mi-
gration has created millions of middle class families 
in the US among people who originally came from 
modest means in Mexico. International migration is 
a large, effective anti-poverty program that doesn’t 
cost the government much additional resources 
and, at the same time, generates gains for consum-
ers and businesses who employ these workers. 
One concern might be that migration, while 
adding workers and consumers to the U.S. econ-
omy, subtracts them from the Mexican econo-
my. There are two ways to mitigate this concern. 
One is through remittances, which studies have 
shown more than make up for the lost income 
of migrant workers who have left Mexico (GDP 
lost to emigration). Another is to implement mi-
gration programs that encourage return migra-
tion. Migrants who are intent on returning will 
invest in Mexico, whether it’s buying a house, 
paying taxes or otherwise contributing to eco-
nomic development in their home communities, 
through programs like Tres por Uno, or at other 
destinations.    
Additional solutions that have been proposed 
in the U.S. include more funding for community 
colleges, state mandated parental leave, and child 
care subsidies. Some academics have proposed 
programs to compensate native workers who lose 
out from immigration. These programs exist for 
workers displaced by trade and could be set up 
for workers that could show they were adversely 
impacted by immigration.57 
Last but not least, a comprehensive approach 
to immigration and inequality has to address the 
large undocumented immigrant population in the 
U.S. These immigrants are unlikely to return to 
Mexico, and their lack of legal status adversely 
affects not only their wages and employment, but 
also the socioeconomic outcomes and income 
mobility of their U.S.-born children.58 
FINAL REMARKS
Inequality has been rising across the world in re-
cent decades. Latin America has been an exception 
to what otherwise seems to be the prevalent trend 
in the U.S., Europe and Asia. In the U.S., the rise in 
inequality since the 1970s has coincided with the 
rise in Mexican immigration. In Mexico, inequali-
ty has been declining since the mid-1990s, a period 
during which emigration first increased to historic 
highs and then declined steeply.
Our review of the literature suggests that low-
skilled immigration to the U.S., much of it from 
Mexico, has only played a minor role in rising 
income and wage inequality. To the extent that 
there is an effect, it has come through the pres-
ence of immigrants, and less as a result of im-
migration’s effect on natives’ wages. Immigrants’ 
bimodal skill distribution, with clustering at the 
top and bottom of the U.S. skill distribution, has 
widened the overall income distribution slightly.  
At the same time, low-skilled immigration to 
the U.S., and migrants’ remittances, have played 
a large role in lowering global inequality by mov-
ing millions of low-income Mexican families fur-
ther away from poverty and closer to the global 
middle class. 
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Migration from poor to rich countries rep-
resents a reallocation of labor that increases the 
wage of the migrant while also raising wages in 
the sending country. It moves labor to capital-rich 
countries where businesses readily employ it. 
Productivity and output rise. As long as business 
investment responds to the worker influx, wage 
effects on native workers will be limited. 
Migration is the last frontier of globalization. 
Removing barriers to international mobility would 
result in large economic gains that far outweigh 
any costs. The problem policymakers face is not 
that migration doesn’t create gains, it’s who gets 
the gains. In the policy discussion, we noted a 
number of policies that help alleviate wage and in-
come inequality, including managed, legal avenues 
for work-based migration. Innovative policy tools 
can redistribute the gains from migration; this is 
preferable to cutting it off.
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